Recycled Newsprint Laws and Differential
Taxation of the Press
Richard Madrist

Several states and municipalities have recently passed laws
that require newspaper publishers to use a specified minimum
percentage of recycled newsprint.' These recycled newsprint laws
represent "a response to the glut of newspapers collected by
communities seeking to reduce the volume of solid waste they
must burn or bury."2 Requiring newspaper publishers to use
recycled paper presumably enlarges the market for such scrap,
eliminates the stockpile of old newspapers, and decreases the
need for new landfills.' The public's heightened awareness of
environmental issues and the continued surplus of collected
newspapers may lead more states to consider such recycling laws
in the future.
Recycled newsprint laws raise a number of important questions under the First Amendment.4 First Amendment concerns
arise because of the potential impact of the laws on newspaper
circulation. Just as taxes decrease the level of consumption of the
t B.S. 1991, Cornell University; J.D. 1994, The University of Chicago.
' Newsprint is the paper on which newspapers are printed. Mandatory recycled
newsprint requirements have been enacted by (among others) California, Cal Pub Resources Code §§ 42750-42791 (West 1986 and Supp 1994); Connecticut, Corn Gen Stat
Ann §§ 22a-256m through 22a-256u (West 1985 and Supp 1993); Wisconsin, Wis Stat Ann
§ 159.31 (West 1989 and Supp 1993); Missouri, Mo Ann Stat § 260.255 (Vernon 1990 and
Supp 1993); Maryland, Md Environment Code Ann § 9-1707 (Michie 1993); the District of
Columbia, DC Code § 6-3419-6-3422 (Michie 1981 and Supp 1993); Arizona, Ariz Rev Stat
Ann § 49-834 (West 1988 and Supp 1993); North Carolina, NC Gen Stat § 105-102.6
(Michie 1992); and Suffolk County, New York, Suffolk County L § 399-13 (1990). See also
Michael Parrish, Debate Flares Over Push to Recycle Newspapers, LA Times D1 (June 2,
1990).
2 Congress Should Scrap Dingell'sRecycling Plan, Newsday 64 (July 10, 1992) (editorial). These used papers, collected through curbside recycling programs, are not currently
recycled into new newspapers.
' "[T]he purpose of the bill is to promote markets for old newspapers ... ."Jim
Puzzanghera and Dan Fagin, Newsprint Bill Kindles Debate, Newsday 4 (May 31, 1990)
(quoting James Tripp of the Environmental Defense Fund).
" The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." The Fourteenth Amendment extends this restriction to
the states. See Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925); Near v Minnesota, 283 US
697, 707 (1931).
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taxed commodity by raising its consumer end price,' recycled
newsprint laws raise the price of newspapers and may result in a
decline in newspaper circulation or a reduction in the number of
pages printed. In either case, the laws decrease the amount of
information disseminated to the public.6 Environmental regulation in the form of recycled newsprint laws could thus have a severe impact on public discourse.7 This Comment addresses these
concerns and argues that recycled newsprint laws are unconstitutional under the First Amendment because they result in differential taxation of the press.
In defining the scope of differential taxation,' the Supreme
Court has held that tax laws targeting the press are presumptively unconstitutional under the First Amendment.9 Recycled
newsprint laws single out newspapers by requiring newspaper
publishers, and only newspaper publishers, to purchase recycled
newsprint. And because recycled newsprint costs more than
virgin paper,'0 that regulatory burden is effectively equivalent to
a tax. Under the Supreme Court's differential taxation rulings,
therefore, recycled newsprint laws appear presumptively unconstitutional under the First Amendment.
Section I of this Comment briefly describes selected state and
county recycled newsprint regulations. Section II discusses the
relevant case law and shows that differential regulatory treatment of the press is subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Section III argues that recycled newsprint laws

' See MinneapolisStar and Tribune Co. v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460
US 575, 590-91 n 14 (1983); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Constitutionalityof State Environmental Taxes, 58 Tulane L Rev 169, 205 (1983).
6 A 15% increase in the price of newspapers will cause approximately a 7.5% decrease in circulation. See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 30
(HarperCollins, 1988); Barnaby J. Feder, The Media Business, NY Times D6 (Nov 9, 1992)
(noting a 17% loss in newsstand sales for newspapers that had raised prices).
7 Newspapers play an enormous role in the marketplace of ideas in America. The
daily newspaper circulation is over 100 million, compared to a combined average daily
audience of 40 million for the newscasts of the three major networks. See George
Comstock, The Evolution ofAmerican Television 102 (Sage, 1989).
' Differential taxation of the press is defined as taxing members of the media in a
manner different from that customarily accorded non-media businesses. See Comment,
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue: Differential
Taxation of the Press Violates the FirstAmendment, 69 Iowa L Rev 1103, 1106 (1984).
See Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 585.
, See Deborah A. Boerner, Recycling the PaperForest,American Forests 37, 42 (July/Aug 1990) (noting in an accompanying editorial note that recycled stock is generally
"prohibitively expensive"). The relative prices of recycled newsprint and virgin newsprint
are continuously in flux as a result of changing pressures on supply and demand. Id. See
also Julian Allen, What Price 'the Only Game in Town'?, 216 Paper 27 (Sept 3, 1991).
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cannot survive this scrutiny. The Section then proposes alternatives that do not violate the Constitution. In particular, states
and localities can legitimately serve their environmental interests by adopting general economic regulations that require all
paper users, not just newspapers, to meet recycled content goals.

I. STATE AND LOCAL RECYCLED NEWSPRINT LAWS
No federal laws regulate the composition of newsprint.1
States and counties, however, are forging ahead with their own
recycled newsprint requirements.1 2 Currently, publishers have
agreed to voluntary plans in New York, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
Massachusetts, and Michigan, and voluntary agreements have
been discussed in Kentucky, New Jersey, and other states."
More importantly for the purposes of this Comment, over twenty
states have enacted coercive legislation forcing newspaper pub-

" Congressman John Dingell, chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, sponsored HR 3865, which would have required newspapers to use newsprint that
contains at least 35% recycled fiber by 1995 and 50% by 2002. See National Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Management Act, HR Rep 102-839, 102d Cong, 2d Sess 54 (Aug 11,
1992). See also Recycling Bill Targets Papers, Newsday 19 (July 2, 1992). A paper that
failed to comply would be required to print on the front page a notice that the newspaper
"does not meet the federal government's required percentage of recycled content." Id.
Although approved by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, Dingell's bill has not
become law. Previous federal bills have also foundered in committee. For example, in
1991, Senator Helms sponsored S 805, which would have promoted the recycling of newsprint by requiring major newspaper publishers to use an average of 40% recycled newsprint per year by the year 2000. S 805, 102nd Cong, 1st Sess (Apr 11, 1991), in 137 Cong
Rec S 4349. The year before, Representative Slaughter had introduced HR 4575, which
would have amended the tax code to allow newspaper publishers a credit against income
tax for using recycled newsprint. HR 4575, 101st Cong, 2nd Sess (Apr 19, 1990), in 136
Cong Rec H 1615. Neither became law.
2 See Parrish, DebateFlares at D1 (cited in note 1). See also the statutes collected in
note 1. Although all the various recycled newsprint laws require newspapers to use a
minimum amount of recycled content, the laws use different means to achieve this goal.
Many states impose fines if a target percentage is not met. See, for example, Conn Gen
Stat Ann § 22a-256o. Wisconsin charges newspapers a fee for each ton of newsprint used,
but offers a credit for each ton of recycled newsprint used. See Wis Stat Ann § 159.31. In
addition, Missouri requires newspaper publishers to report their recycled content and sets
target percentages, but does not impose a fine for failure to meet the target. See Mo Ann
Stat § 260.255. These variations do not impact the analysis of this Comment, because all
of the laws share an important feature: they single out newspapers for a burden that no
other business must bear.
13 Parrish, Debate Flares at D1. Some of these "voluntary" agreements may not be so
voluntary-that is, publishers may enter into them to forestall coercive legislation. For
example, in Oregon's Multnomah County, a ballot drive for mandatory recycled newsprint
was derailed only after the publisher of the Portland Oregonian agreed to a voluntary
plan. Id.
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lishers to use paper containing recycled fiber.'4 Many of these
laws single out large newspapers and apply only to newsprint
and not to other paper.
Two such laws have achieved national prominence.
California's Integrated Waste Management Act of 1989'5 requires all newspapers distributed in California to contain at least
50 percent recycled paper by the year 2000.16 The statute sets
out the following timetable: a newspaper must be comprised of 25
percent recycled newsprint by 1991; 30 percent by 1994; 35 percent by 1996; 40 percent by 1998; and 50 percent by 2000.17 Similarly, an ordinance of Suffolk County, New York"8 requires that
by the end of 1996, every newspaper distributed or sold in Suffolk County be printed on paper that is 40 percent recycled.'"
Some recycled newsprint laws exempt newspapers with small
circulations. For example, Wisconsin's statute does not apply to
newspapers with a circulation under 20,000,20 while the Missouri recycled newsprint law does not apply to newspapers with an
average daily distribution of 15,000 copies or less.2
In general, recycled newsprint laws carry stiff penalties for
failing to use recycled paper. The standard fine is $50 per ton,
which is roughly equivalent to ten percent of the value of the
paper used.22 In Connecticut, the fine for noncompliance can be
as high as $100,000.2 The Suffolk County Law is enforceable by
a $500 fine for each day a newspaper publishes in violation of the
law's requirements.' To monitor compliance, Suffolk County
officials plan to visit publishing plants inside and outside Suffolk

14 See Allen, 216 Paper at 27 (cited in note 10).
19 Cal Pub Resources Code §§ 42750-42791.
16 Id at § 42761.
1'7 Id at §§ 42760-42761.

'8 Suffolk County L §§ 399-10-399-18 (1992).
19 Suffolk County L § 399-13(A)(6).
29 Wis Stat Ann § 159.31(4)(c). Suffolk County may have a similar exemption. Formerly, the exemption appeared at Suffolk Law § 399-13(A)(4), a subsection that has since
been repealed. However, Suffolk County Legislator Maxine Postal, the sponsor of the most
recent version of the Suffolk statute, maintains that the exemption is still considered part
of the County Code. Telephone conversations with Maxine Postal and Paul Sabatino,
counsel to the Suffolk County Legislature (Feb 4, 1994) (memorandum on file with U Chi
L Rev) (claiming the deletion was probably inadvertent).
21 Mo Ann Stat § 260.255(1).
' See Allen, 216 Paper at 27 (cited in note 10).
2
Gen Stat Conn § 22a-256o.
2
Suffolk County L § 399-16. See also Puzzanghera and Fagin, Newsprint Bill

Kindles Debate at 4 (cited in note 3).
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County to conduct spot checks on newsprint fiber content and
also to ask publishers to certify compliance.'
II.DIFFERENTIAL TAXATION OF THE PRESS
Although there are no cases directly on point,2" other First
Amendment cases addressing taxation and regulation of the
press shed light on the constitutionality of recycled newsprint
laws. This Section discusses the differential-treatment precedents, highlighting the different standards applied to generally
applicable regulation cases on the one hand and to differentialtaxation cases on the other. It then argues that the differentialtaxation standard has been extended to other types of differential
economic regulation of the press and should be extended to recycled newsprint laws as well.
A. The First Amendment Framework
Different types of state-imposed speech regulations are analyzed under different levels of constitutional scrutiny. Government regulations affecting speech are often classified as either
"content based" or "content neutral." 7 Content-based restrictions limit expression because of the communicative impact of the
speech.' In order for a content-based regulation to survive, the
government generally must show that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest." This "strict scrutiny'" test has been used to invalidate statutes in a variety of

2

Id.

One reason courts have not yet considered the constitutionality of mandatory recycled newsprint laws is that many of the recycled newsprint requirements do not take full
effect until 1996 or later. But as the deadlines approach, publishers will likely seek relief.
Other factors can also delay judicial scrutiny of these laws. For example, the Republican
county executive of Suffolk County has simply refused to enforce the county's recycled
newsprint law enacted by the Democratic legislature. Telephone conversations (cited in
note 20).
' See Laurence H. Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw § 12-2 (Foundation, 2d ed
1988).
'
See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-NeutralRestrictions, 54 U Chi L Rev 46, 47 (1987).
See Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 268-70 (1981). The government may also
satisfy its burden by proving that the speech affected falls within an "unprotected" category of expression. These unprotected categories include speech likely to incite imminent
lawless action, Brandenburgv Ohio, 395 US 444, 447 (1969); obscenity, Miller v California, 413 US 15, 20 (1973); and some forms of defamation, Gertz v Welch, 418 US 323, 34748 (1974).
30 The strict scrutiny test originated in the Supreme Court's equal protection jurisprudence. In a concurring opinion in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v New York State Crime
Victims Board, 112 S Ct 501, 513 (1991), Justice Kennedy traced the migration of the
'
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freedom of expression cases.3 In contrast to content-based laws,
content-neutral restrictions limit communication without regard
to the content of the message conveyed. 2 Content-neutral statutes are generally given greater deference by the courts, which
often apply a less demanding standard in such cases.33
Like content-neutral statutes, tax laws affecting only newspapers burden speech without regard to its communicative effect.
Yet the Supreme Court has often compared statutes imposing
special tax burdens on the press to statutes in the content-based
category.34 In Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue, the Court noted that statutes that
apply only to the press have a large potential for abuse and thus
are analogous to content-based restrictions.35 Similarly, in Leathers v Medlock, the Court compared a tax targeting a small number of speakers to a content-based regulation, concluding that
both "distort the market for ideas." 6 Differential taxation of the

strict scrutiny standard to First Amendment analysis. For a discussion of Simon &
Schuster, see text accompanying notes 74-76. For a discussion of the longstanding debate
over the appropriate approach in content-based cases, see Gerald Gunther, Constitutional
Law 1069-70 (Foundation, 12th ed 1991).
" Relatively recent examples of the First Amendment application of strict scrutiny
include Metromedia, Inc. v San Diego, 453 US 490 (1981) (striking down an ordinance
that prohibited billboards containing certain noncommercial speech); Widmar, 454 US 263
(striking down a university policy prohibiting the use of university buildings for religious
purposes); Boos v Barry, 485 US 312 (1988) (striking down a law prohibiting certain
public displays in front of foreign embassies).
2 See Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 48 (cited in note 28).
See Tribe, American ConstitutionalLaw at § 12-8 (cited in note 27). One commentator has argued that a careful review of the Supreme Court's decisions reveals three
distinct standards for content-neutral restrictions: deferential, intermediate, and strict
review. See Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 50.
4 In differential taxation cases, the Supreme Court has focused its analysis on the
First Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, because the legislation
implicates freedom of the press. See, for example, Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v
Ragland, 481 US 221, 227-28 n 3 (1987) ("First Amendment claims are obviously intertwined with interests arising under the Equal Protection Clause... [but] since
Arkansas's sales tax system directly implicates Freedom of the Press, we analyze it
primarily in First Amendment terms."); MinneapolisStar, 460 US at 585-86 n 7 (viewing
the differential taxation problem as "arising directly under the First Amendment"). The
dissent in MinneapolisStar argued that differential taxation should be subject to scrutiny
only under the Equal Protection Clause. Id at 598-600 (Rehnquist dissenting). However,
the majority explicitly rejected this argument. Id at 585-86 n 7. See also Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev 189, 206
(1983) ("The degree of scrutiny that is appropriate in [testing] content-based restrictions
[is] fundamentally a First Amendment issue. Invocation of the Equal Protection Clause
adds nothing constructive to the analysis.").
35 460 US 575, 582 (1983) (holding such taxes "cannot stand unless the burden is
necessary to achieve an overriding governmental interest").
36 499 US 439, 448 (1991).
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press does not seem to fit neatly into either the content-neutral
or the content-based framework, and perhaps is best understood
as falling within this separate, hybrid category."
No matter how they are classified, the differential-taxation
cases receive the highest level of scrutiny from the Court. Taxes
aimed at the press are subject to strict scrutiny.3 8 In contrast,
strict scrutiny is not applied to general economic regulations that
merely affect the press.3 9 The difference between such generally
applicable economic regulations and differential taxation is critical to evaluating the constitutionality of the recycled newsprint
laws.
1. Generally applicable economic regulations.
Congress and the States can subject newspapers to generally
applicable economic regulations4" and tax legislation4 ' without
creating constitutional problems. For example, in Associated
Press v NLRB, the Court upheld the application of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") to the Associated Press news service.4 2 After discharging an employee for his membership in a
labor organization, the Associated Press argued that the First
Amendment shielded it from the NLRA, which prohibits employers from discharging employees for labor activities.4" The Court
' Stone places the differential taxation cases by themselves in a strict-scrutiny subcategory of content-neutral review. Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 53 n 31 (cited in note 28).
' See, for example, Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 582 (applying strict scrutiny because "Minnesota has singled out the press for special treatment"); Arkansas Writers'
Project, 481 US at 227 ("Our cases clearly establish that a discriminatory tax on the press
burdens rights protected by the First Amendment.").
'3 See, for example, MinneapolisStar, 460 US at 581 ("It is beyond dispute that the
states and the federal government can subject newspapers to generally applicable economic regulations without creating constitutional problems.").
4 The Supreme Court "has recognized the strong governmental interest in certain
forms of economic regulation, even though such regulation may have an incidental effect
on rights of speech and association." NAACP v Claiborne HardwareCo., 458 US 886, 912
(1982). See also CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v Trucking Unlimited, 404 US 508, 514-15
(1972) (holding anticompetitive activity is not immunized from trade-practice regulation
because it is engaged in by members of the communications industry).
41 See University of Pennsylvania v EEOC, 493 US 182, 200 (1990) (noting that a
university can be subjected to a generally applicable tax without violating its First
Amendment right to academic freedom); Jimmy Swaggart Ministriesv Board of Equalization, 493 US 378, 387-88 (1990) (holding that the imposition of a general sales and use tax
on a religious organization's distribution of religious materials does not violate the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment); Branzburg v Hayes, 408 US 665, 683 (noting that
the First Amendment is not violated by nondiscriminatory forms of general taxation upon
the press).
42 301 US 103, 130 (1937).
43 Id at 131. See also 29 USC § 151 (1988).
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held that the First Amendment does not prohibit all regulation of
the press: "The business of the Associated Press is not immune
from regulation because it is an agency of the press. The publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the
rights and liberties of others."'
Following Associated Press, the Court has held that general
regulatory schemes, such as antitrust laws," the Fair Labor
Standards Act,46 and health and safety regulations" can be applied to the press without raising significant First Amendment
concerns. In Arcara v Cloud Books, for example, the Court upheld
the application of the New York Public Health Law to a bookstore." New York authorities shut down an adult bookstore
pursuant to a law that authorized the forced closure of a building
for one year if it had been used for the purpose of lewdness, assiguation, or prostitution.49 The application of the statute to the
bookstore did not violate the First Amendment because all buildings, and not just bookstores, were subject to the regulation."
2. Differential taxation.
Since 1936, the Court has found economic regulations aimed
exclusively at protected speakers to be unconstitutional under the
First Amendment. In Grosjean v American Press Co., Inc., the
Court struck down a Louisiana tax affecting only thirteen out of
137 publications in the state.5 ' The thirteen newspapers, each of
which had weekly circulations over 20,000, were singled out in
an attempt to punish Senator Huey Long's political enemies-the
large newspapers in Louisiana.52 The Court noted that the tax
would limit the newspapers' circulation, and that if increased,
the tax could eliminate the papers altogether." Grosjean made
it clear that the First Amendment prohibits statutes that apply
only to selected speakers.54 Although the legislative purpose of
301 US at 132-33.
4 Citizen PublishingCo. v United States, 394 US 131, 139-40 (1969).
4 Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v Walling, 327 US 186, 192-93 (1946).
47 Arcara v Cloud Books, Inc., 478 US 697, 707 (1986).
48 Id at 699, 707.
" Id at 699. There was no claim in Arcara that any books in the store were obscene.
Id at 698.
44

50

Id at 705.

5' 297 US 233, 240-41, 251 (1936).
12 See Note, FirstAmendment Limits on the Use of Taxes to Subsidize Selectively
the
Media, 78 Cornell L Rev 106, 109 (1992).
53 297 US at 244-45.
' Following Grosjean, two state courts struck down regulations that burdened the
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punishing Huey Long's enemies may have accounted in part for
the Court's decision, the Court implied that any laws reducing
newspaper circulation were constitutionally suspect. Indeed, the
Supreme Court's subsequent differential taxation cases have not
even required an improper legislative motive.
Minneapolis Star declared that improper motive is not a
necessary part of a First Amendment challenge. 5 In Minneapolis Star, the Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota use-tax on
the sale of large quantities of newsprint and ink.5 6 The use-tax
exempted the first $100,000 of paper and ink for each publisher,
so the burden of the tax fell almost exclusively on large newspapers.57 Striking down both the Minnesota use-tax and its exemption on First Amendment grounds, the Court held that: (1) the
press cannot be singled out from other businesses for the imposition of special burdens and (2) taxes cannot be imposed on some
members of the press but not on others.5 8
The first part of this holding acts as a prophylactic rule to
guard against the dangers of differential treatment of the press.
In dissent, Justice Rehnquist argued that the newspapers had
paid less under the special tax than they would have paid under
Minnesota's general tax scheme.5 9 However, the majority was
not concerned with the size of the burden. Instead, the majority
focused on the potential for legislative abuse "[w]hen the state
singles out the press, [because] the political constraints that
prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general
applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes
becomes acute." ° In contrast, generally applicable laws force
governments to impose the same burden on a wide range of con-

press. A Florida court invalidated a license tax that increased with circulation, concluding
that Grosjean prohibited any tax on the press based on circulation. City of Tampa v
Tampa Times Co., 153 Fla 709, 711, 15 S2d 612, 613 (1943). A Maryland court also struck
down a tax imposed on buyers of advertising in media. City of Baltimore v A.S. Abell Co.,
218 Md 273, 288-89, 145 A2d 111, 119 (1958).
' 460 US at 592. In Simon & Schuster, the Court reaffirmed that "[i]llicit legislative
intent is not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment." 112 S Ct at 509,
quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 592.
' Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 577-78, 593. Minnesota had imposed a 4% tax on the
cost of paper and ink products exceeding $100,000 used in the production of a publication.
Id at 578 n 2.
" Id at 578. Because of this exemption, only 16 of the State's 374 newspapers were
subject to the tax in 1975. Id at 579.
" "[The differential] tax violates the First Amendment not only because it singles out
the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers." Id at 591.
" Id at 598 (Rehnquist dissenting).
60 Id at 585.
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stituents, reducing opportunities for abuse.6 Unwilling to rely
on a case-by-case approach to separate laws that burdened First
Amendment actors from laws that benefitted them, the Court
concluded that any tax statute singling out the press was presumptively unconstitutional. 2
The second part of the holding addressed the additional
problems of applying different tax treatment to different members of the press. The small-newspaper exemption to the Minnesota use-tax provided an independent basis for striking down the
statute because the exemption had the effect of limiting the tax
to a few large newspapers.6 3 For the same reasons that the
press must be treated like other businesses, the Court held that
different newspapers must be treated alike. The Court stated
that a tax scheme singling out only a few members of the press
"presents such a potential for abuse that no [state interest] can
justify the scheme.""
Relying on Minneapolis Star, the Court has held that a statute cannot impose different tax burdens on different publications
according to their subject matter. In Arkansas Writers' Project,
Inc. v Ragland, the Court struck down a state sales tax statute
that applied to general-interest magazines but not to newspapers
or specialized journals.6 5 Noting that the sales tax applied to
some but not to all magazines, and that only three publications
paid sales tax under the statute, the Court held that Minneapolis

6 One commentator has suggested an additional problem with differential taxation:
"[A sound] reason for making constitutionally suspect any formal singling out of the press
[is] to protect the political neutrality of the press... [and to] prevent the government
from undermining the [neutrality of the press] by forcing [it] to engage actively in the political process in order to protect its own self-interest." Randall P. Bezanson, PoliticalAgnosticism, EditorialFreedom, and Government Neutrality Toward the Press: Observations
on Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commission of Revenue, 72 Iowa L
Rev 1359, 1371 (1987). See also Rob Bennett, Taxing the Marketplace of Ideas, 51 Tax
Notes 1317 (June 10, 1991) (noting that political intrigue is a likely source of differential
taxation).
62 "Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the interests
protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such treatment unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it cannot achieve
without differential taxation." Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 585. The Court provided the
following justification for its ruling: "There is substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment .... The
fears of the [Framers] were well founded. [The] threat [of differential taxation] can operate as effectively as a censor to check critical comment by the press ... ." Id at 583-85.
'
Id at 591-92.
6' Id at 592.

6 481 US 221, 224 (1987). Specialized journals included religious, professional, trade,
and sports magazines. Id.
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Star prohibited such a tax.66 Although the tax did not discriminate among particular points of view, it applied only to
certain subject areas and therefore triggered strict scrutiny. The
Court stressed that differential treatment of the press-either
the press as a whole or individual members of the press-posed
particular dangers of governmental abuse.
Although tax statutes must not single out the press or individual members of the press, a state can exempt some members
of the press, but not others, from a generally applicable tax. In
Leathers v Medlock, the Court upheld a broad-based Arkansas
sales-tax scheme that taxed cable television but not magazine
and newspaper sales.' Applying a differential-taxation analysis,
the Court concluded that the tax scheme did not single out the
press because it applied to the sale of all tangible personal property as well as a broad range of services.69 Although newspapers
were not included, the statute's broad application provided some
safeguard
against the potential for abuse present in the earlier
70
cases.

In Leathers, the Court restated its general presumption
against differential taxation of the media, noting that tax statutes that (1) single out the press, (2) target small groups of
speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the content of taxpayer speech, are subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.7 The Leathers test thus combines the established
principles
of both Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers' Pro72

ject.

As these differential-taxation cases illustrate, states are
prohibited from singling out the press as a whole or members of
the press for special tax burdens. Most recycled newsprint laws
target only newspapers. Therefore, whether the strict scrutiny
mandated by Leathers will apply to the recycled newsprint con-

" Id at 234.
Id at 228.

6

499 US 439 (1991). The sales and use tax in question applied to a broad range of
non-media services, including utilities, telecommunications, lodging, maintenance, printing, and ticket distribution. See Ark Code Ann § 26-52-301 (Michie 1992).
" 499 US at 447.
70 Id.
7

Id.

' For an application of Leathers, see Globe Newspaper Co. v Commissioner of Revenue, 410 Mass 188, 571 NE2d 617 (1991) (using the Leathers analysis to invalidate a
sales-tax scheme that subjected newspaper publishers to different tax treatment than
other manufacturers).
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tent laws depends on whether the differential tax cases extend to
cover other forms of economic regulation.
B. Differential-Tax Cases Apply to Economic Regulations
Although most Supreme Court cases in the area of "differential taxation" involve tax statutes, some have involved other sorts
of economic regulations targeting the press.73 In fact, the Supreme Court recently applied differential-taxation analysis to a
content-based regulation that was not a tax. In Simon &
Schuster v New York State Crime Victims Board, the Court invalidated New York's "Son of Sam" law, which compensated crime
victims with the confiscated proceeds of books written by criminals describing their crimes.74 The statute violated the first and
third prongs of the Leathers test: it singled out income derived
from expressive activity for a regulatory burden that the State
placed on no other income, and applied only to works about a
specified subject.75 New York attempted to distinguish the Son
of Sam law from the tax in Arkansas Writers' Project by arguing
that Arkansas Writers' Project was limited to tax statutes. The
Court rejected this argument, holding that a regulation placing
income from speech in escrow should be treated similarly to an
outright tax. "Both forms of financial burden operate as
disincentives to speak; indeed, in many cases it will be impossible to discern in advance which type of regulation will be more
costly to the speaker."76
The Court has equated regulation with taxation in other
differential taxation cases as well. In Arkansas Writers' Project,
Justice Scalia dissented precisely because the majority assumed
that, for First Amendment purposes, the denial of an exemption
from taxation is equivalent to regulation.77 Furthermore,
Leathers drew an analogy between tax statutes and labor laws.
Although labor laws were not tax laws, the Court found that they

' A formalistic court might draw a distinction between taxes and regulations in the
differential taxation cases. However, courts have in fact approached this issue on a functional basis and have at times treated non-tax regulations as analytically equivalent to
differential taxation regulations.
74 112 S Ct 501, 504-05, 512 (1991), citing NY Exec Law § 632-a (McKinney 1982 and
Supp 1994).
7 Simon & Schuster, 112 S Ct at 509.
, Id at 508-09.
"
See Arkansas Writers' Project,481 US at 236 (Scalia dissenting).
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could be compared to taxes because both involved government
action that placed burdens on members of the press.78
In addition, several lower courts have explicitly stated that
economic regulation of the press and taxation of the press should
be treated similarly under the First Amendment. In Associated
Film Distribution Corp v Thornburgh, the Third Circuit used
differential-taxation analysis to consider the validity of a Pennsylvania statute regulating the exhibition and production of motion pictures.79 The court held that the statute, which sought to
eliminate unfair business practice in the industry, was a contentneutral application of the state's general regulation of unfair
business practices.' In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that "[tihe rationale of Minneapolis Star may require its extension beyond taxation to regulations that impose differential
penalties directly on some First Amendment activity. Certainly,
some regulation may in effect control the activity regulated as
effectively as would taxation.""'
Similarly, other courts have extended Minneapolis Star to
non-tax regulation that imposes differential penalties directly on
First Amendment activity. For example, in J-R Distributors,Inc.
v Eikenberry, the Ninth Circuit followed Minneapolis Star and
invalidated a statute that imposed fines based on the profits
generated from the exhibition of obscene movies.82 The court
concluded that noncompliance fines that increase in proportion to
the extent of the prohibited activity are similar to use-taxes and
therefore invalid, absent a compelling state interest."
This extension of the differential taxation standard to other
forms of regulation finds support in the language of Minneapolis
Star. There, the Court provided examples of economic regulation' and concluded that "a regulation that singled out the
press [would] place a heavier burden of justification on the
State...

28

."5 Indeed,

the Court placed the words "tax" and "eco-

Leathers, 499 US at 452-53.

800 F2d 369, 373-75 (3d Cir 1986).
o Id at 374-75. The Supreme Court relied on a similar theory in CaliforniaMotor
Transport,404 US at 514-15.
'1 Associated Film, 800 F2d at 374 (citations omitted).
725 F2d 482, 495-96 (9th Cir 1984) ("The Court's reasoning [in Minneapolis Star] is
as applicable to fines as taxes."), rev'd on other grounds as Brockett v Spokane Arcades,
Inc., 472 US 491 (1985).
J-R Distributors,725 F2d at 495-96.
79

For example, the Court noted that the Fair Labor Standards Act is an economic
regulation. 460 US at 583, citing Oklahoma Press, 327 US 186.
"s MinneapolisStar, 460 US at 583.
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nomic regulation" in parallel sentence structure: "Any tax that
the press must pay, of course, imposes some 'burden.' But, as we
have observed, this Court has long upheld economic regulation of
the press."86 The Court's use of "tax" and "regulation" interchangeably in Minneapolis Star indicates that a "tax" and a "regulation" should be treated similarly for purposes of the First
Amendment.
Moreover, lower courts have extended Minneapolis Star to
other forms of regulation because it makes sense to do so. Regulation can limit an activity as effectively as taxation.8 7 Like taxes, most regulations increase the costs of newspaper operations,
and the burdens imposed by regulations can be augmented by the
legislature." Indeed, regulations can be more burdensome to
apply than taxes and can lead to more litigation.8 9 Therefore,
the differential taxation cases have appropriately been extended
to require strict scrutiny of other cases involving the economic
regulation of the press.
III. APPLICATION OF THE CASE LAW TO RECYCLED
NEWSPRINT LAWS
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies to Recycled Newsprint Laws
Recycled newsprint laws are a form of economic regulation
and should therefore be treated like a tax on publishers. These
laws raise the cost of producing newspapers by effectively taxing
all expenditures for newsprint. Because, like a tax, recycled content laws impose a burden that can be increased at the discretion
of the legislature and can be augmented by additional regulations
of a similar type, they present the same dangers presented by

" Id (emphasis added). The Court was not endorsing differential economic regulation,
but merely noting that the cases upholding regulations emphasize the general applicability of the challenged regulation to all businesses. Id.
"7 Terry M. Dinan, Implementation Issues for Marketable Permits:A Case Study of
Newsprint, 4 J Reg Econ 71 (1992) (explaining how permit requirements act as a tax on
the newsprint industry). For an empirical confirmation of this point, see Robert A.
Androkovich and Kenneth R. Stollery, Tax Versus Quota Regulation:A Stochastic Model
of the Fishery, 73 Am JAg Econ 300 (1991).
Indeed, some states admit that their recycled newsprint laws are effectively taxes.
For example, North Carolina calls its statute a "license tax on producers of newsprint
publications," and the law is codified under 'Taxation" in NC Gen Stat § 105-102.6. The
Wisconsin legislature also considers recycled newsprint laws to be equivalent to a tax. See
Wis Stat Ann § 159.31(b)(1)(b).
See Grosjean,297 US at 244-45; MinneapolisStar, 460 US at 590-91 n 14.
Stephen Breyer, Taxes as a Substitute for Regulation, 10 Growth and Change 39,
48, 52 n 18 (Jan 1979).
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differential taxation of the press. Recycled newsprint laws are
precisely the type of laws requiring an extension of the differential taxation principles, and the Leathers test should therefore
apply. Under the differential-taxation standard, recycled content
laws are constitutionally questionable for two reasons. First, they
apply only to newspapers and not to other potential users of
recycled newsprint. Second, they single out only large newspapers.
Recycled newsprint laws such as the California Act violate
the first prong of the Leathers test;9" the law applies only to
newspapers, and not to other recycled newsprint consumers.91
Recycled newsprint can be used in the manufacture of many
other products, including cereal boxes, egg cartons, paper bags,
hydromulch, tissue products, and gypsum wallboard.9 2 The recycled newsprint laws enacted to date do not require these other
industries to use a minimum level of recycled product,9" and
therefore cannot be said to represent part of a general regulatory
scheme in the same way as the broad-based tax in Leathers.
Because the press may not be singled out to bear special burdens, these laws are subject to strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.
It makes sense to apply strict scrutiny to recycled newsprint
laws because they single out newspapers for significant financial
burdens.' Recycled content laws limit the ability of users to
respond flexibly to particular costs and constraints.9" Because
these laws prohibit newspapers from switching to virgin paper,
the demand for recycled paper will increase. Recycled-paper manNamely, whether a statute singles out the press. See Leathers, 499 US at 447.
"

See Maria L. LaGranga, Recycling Boom Provides Too Much of a Good Thing, LA

Times Al (Dec 28, 1992) (Newspapers are the target of the only law that "tells the private
sector what to do" in terms of recycling.).
' See BNA, Groups Urge Federal Legislation to Mandate Recycled Newsprint Use,
1992 Daily Envir Rept 219 d28 (Nov 12, 1992).
' Except in the District of Columbia. See discussion at text accompanying notes 124-

28.
9

The financial burdens include the initial costs of converting existing virgin pulp

processing plants to recycling plants, as well as the higher per-ton costs of the paper produced. Allen, 216 Paper at 27 (cited in note 10). In addition, although the industry (mills)
was once near the source of its supply (tree farms), recycling laws in effect move part of
the source to more distant urban areas (recycling centers). Freight costs are thus substantially increased as a result. Id.
' Moreover, publishers prefer not to buy paper from the recycled market because
recycled newsprint prices vary more than virgin paper. See Note, Confronting the Garbage
Crisis:Increased Federal Involvement As a Means of Addressing Municipal Solid Waste
Disposal, 79 Georgetown L J 567, 570 n 21 (1991), citing Office of Solid Waste, United
States EPA, The Solid Waste Dilemma: An Agenda ForAction 15 (1989).

1084

The University of Chicago Law Review

[61:1069

ufacturers, who often maintain regional monopolies,9 6 will raise
their prices if their customers must buy recycled newsprint.9 7 In
addition, recycled newsprint statutes result in an increased burden for national newspapers that will face the costs of complying
with a hodgepodge of state and local statutes.9" If the national
papers have to comply with various states' recycled newsprint
laws, they might have to pull out of the more restrictive states. It
might be prohibitively costly for a national paper like the Wall
Street Journal,for example, to print a specially produced edition
for distribution in a small market.
Many recycled newsprint laws also violate the second prong
of Leathers, which prohibits targeting small groups of speakers.9 9 Exemptions for papers with circulations below a specified
level effectively limit the application of these laws to the major
daily papers in a region. In Minneapolis Star, the Court struck
down the Minnesota use-tax, in part, because it singled out the
large publishers.0 0
States cannot justify the small-paper exemption as an attempt to encourage fledgling local publishers, who might not be
able to afford recycled paper.' The exemption is a subsidy to
selected members of the press, and Minneapolis Star prohibits
such differential treatment.0 2 In recycled newsprint cases, as in
Minneapolis Star, the exemption may induce newspapers, especially those with circulations slightly above the exemption limit,
to restrict circulation in order to cut down on recycled newsprint
costs or to avoid the regulation altogether. Nor can the government impose a greater regulatory burden on the larger papers
just because they are more profitable. First, higher circulation
may not result in greater profitability. Second, progressive taxation of the press is unconstitutional under the First Amendment
because of the differential burdens that it imposes.' °3
'9 Only 9 of the 64 newsprint mills in the United States and Canada are capable of
producing newsprint made from 100% recycled fibers. See Dinan, 4 J Reg Econ at 73
(cited in note 87).
See Parrish, DebateFlares at D1 (cited in note 1).
98 Id. A state's application of a recycled newsprint law to newspapers produced out-ofstate might also raise separate Commerce Clause issues.
Leathers, 499 US at 447.
10 460 US at 591-92.
o The ability of the Minneapolis Star and Tribune to bear the burden of the tax was

not a factor in MinneapolisStar, for "when the exemption selects such a narrowly defined
group to bear the full burden of the tax, the tax begins to resemble more a penalty for a
few of the largest newspapers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller enterprises." Id
at 592.
102

Id at 592-93.

103

See Richard A. Epstein, Property,Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U Chi L
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Moreover, differential regulation of the press merits strict
scrutiny because if the state has the power to single out the
press, it retains the power to impose additional burdens on the
press.0 4 Minneapolis Star noted that "'[tihe threat of sanctions
may deter [the] exercise [of First Amendment rights] almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions." ' 10 5 The state
could, for example, increase the required recycled content to 100
percent or place other restrictions on the newspaper's production,
such as the type and quality of ink used. The cumulative burden
of such regulations could "impair, perhaps severely, [the] proper
functioning" of the press.' The prophylactic rule of Minneapolis Star is designed to prevent such an accumulation of burdens.
B. Application Of Strict Scrutiny to Recycled Newsprint Laws
The differential-taxation cases indicate that recycled newsprint laws should be subjected to strict scrutiny. To survive strict
scrutiny, a statute must serve a compelling state interest and
must be narrowly drawn to achieve that end.0 7 Thus, not only
must the goal be very important, but the "fit" between the means
and the end must be extremely tight. In practice, a statute analyzed under a strict-scrutiny standard almost always fails.' 8
1. Compelling state interest.
This subsection discusses the environmental purposes of
recycled newsprint laws solely to identify a possible "compelling
state interest." It does not purport to provide the final word on
the potential benefits and harms of recycling and recycled content
statutes; after considerable debate, environmental experts still
disagree on these issues. A court evaluating a proffered state
interest will have to look at the empirical data supplied by liti-

Rev 41, 86 (1992).
1"4 See Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 588; Bigelow v Virginia, 421 US 809, 828-29

(1975) (reasoning that a state cannot proscribe advertising for out-of-state abortion
services because allowing such regulation could lead to more burdensome regulation of
newspaper content).
1" Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 588, quoting NAACP v Button, 371 US 415, 433
(1963).
106 Bigelow, 421 US at 829.
..
7 Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 585; Arkansas Writers' Project,481 US at 231.
" See Stone, 54 U Chi L Rev at 53 (cited in note 28). However, another commentator
has argued that the Court has shown that it is willing to uphold a statute reviewed under
strict scrutiny in certain circumstances. See Frederick Schauer, Codifying the First
Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 S Ct Rev 285, 304-06.
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gants before making its decision. In any case, the state would
bear the burden of proof on this issue.' °9
State legislatures have passed recycled newsprint laws primarily to slow down the filling of landfills.10 Landfills are in
short supply, especially in the northeastern United States."'
Given the resistance to siting new landfills, legislatures have
chosen recycling as a solution to the solid waste disposal problem."' Moreover, the recycling regulations focus on paper because it accounts for 32 percent by volume of municipal solid
waste,"' with newspapers alone constituting one third of the
volume of discarded paper."' In the alternative, the state may
assert that these laws will protect forests or conserve energy. A
court would likely face conflicting and incongruous data on these
claims as well."'
Conserving landfill space may in fact not be an important
enough state interest to justify recycled newsprint laws. Some
evidence suggests that the dangers of landfills have been exaggerated."6 Moreover, many recycled newsprint laws simply
shift landfill dumping costs from towns to newspapers." 7 In-

'

Arkansas Writers' Project,481 US at 231.

110

See Lynn Scarlett, A Forum: Will the U.S. Recycling Approach Work?, EPA Journal

42, 42-43 (Aug 1992). The goal of the legislation is to increase the market for recycled
paper. See Suffolk County Law § 399-10(D) ("T]he purpose of this law is to ... encourage
the development of additional markets for recycled newsprint."); Puzzanghera and Fagin,
Newsprint Bill Kindles Debate at 4 (cited in note 3). Presumably an increased market in
recycled newsprint would decrease the need for landfill space.
". For a general discussion of landfills, see William L. Rathje, Rubbish!, The Atlantic
99 (Dec 1989).
1
See Dinan, 4 J Reg Econ at 72 (cited in note 87).
113 Are You a Green Consumer?, Consumer Reports 704, 706 (Nov 1992).
114 Witold Rybczynski, We Are What We Throw Away, NY Times Sec 7 at 5 (July 5,
1992).
1

Recycling paper does not save forests because "[t]rees used for paper are usually

grown on 'tree farms' for that purpose and are harvested at sustainable rates. Virtually no
paper comes from the logging of ancient, irreplaceable forests." Green Consumer? at 705;
Marcia Berss, No One Wants to Shoot Snow White, Forbes 40 (Oct 14, 1991). Similarly,
recycling newspapers has not been shown to save energy. "To show that recycling paper
actually saves energy would require analyzing energy use for the entire lifecycle of paper
made from both raw materials-pulpwood and waste paper. So far, no convincing analysis
of this type has appeared." Green Consumer? at 705-06. For newsprint, collecting and
transporting recycled material may actually consume more energy than can be conserved
in the manufacturing process. Scarlett, EPA Journal at 42 (cited in note 110).
. According to United States Environmental Protection Agency studies, modem
state-of-the-art landfills pose little risk to public health. Scarlett, EPA Journal at 43.
Similarly, a Suffolk County Health Department report says that contrary to popular
belief, landfills neither pollute nor contaminate groundwater. Ann Becker Bennett, The
Island's Towns Team Up to Manage Waste, Long Island Business News 30 .(June 8, 1992).
17 For example, Suffolk County found that:
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deed, the surplus of old newspapers can be eliminated by communities paying to have old newspapers removed." 8 A more compelling state interest than easing the financial obligations of
towns is required to force newspapers to bear this increased
burden." 9
In other contexts, the Supreme Court has refused to subordinate First Amendment rights to seemingly strong state interests." Therefore, it is unlikely that these environmental
goals-subject as they are to so much scientific debate-provide a
sufficiently compelling state interest to justify special regulation
of the press. Nonetheless, in order to anticipate and rebut other
objections, this Comment will assume that a state could satisfy
the compelling-interest requirement.
2. Recycled newsprint laws are not narrowly tailored to
achieve the state's interest.
Even if the recycled newsprint laws satisfy the compelling
state interest prong, they are not narrowly tailored to serve that
end. To survive strict scrutiny, the laws must be the least restrictive alternatives available to advance the state's interest. 121 In

[Nlewspapers printed within the County of Suffolk constitute one of the largest
sources of materials that wind up either in landfills or as part of costly programs for
disposal by municipalities, the cost for which disposal has recently risen to such an
extent as to endanger the fiscal viability of various municipalities located within the

County of Suffolk.
Suffolk County Code § 399-10 (A). See also Puzzanghera and Fagin, Newsprint Bill Kindles Debate at 4 (cited in note 3) (municipalities believe the Suffolk County law will bring
down the per-ton cost to towns of removing newspapers).
18 See Deborah Vaughn Nestor, Partial Static Equilibrium Model Of Newsprint
Recycling, 24 Applied Econ 411 (1992).
.1.In Minneapolis Star, raising revenue alone was not a sufficient justification for

differential treatment of the press. See 460 US at 586.
120 See, for example, Landmark Communications, Inc. v Virginia, 435 US 829 (1978)
(state's interest in protecting the integrity of its judiciary); NebraskaPressAssociationv Stu-

art, 427 US 539 (1976) (state's interest in ensuring right to fair trial for criminal defendant); Oklahoma PublishingCo. v District Court,430 US 308 (1977) (state's interest in
preserving the anonymity of juvenile offenders).
For an instance where the state interest was deemed compelling enough to overcome
First Amendment objections, see Austin v Michigan Chamberof Commerce, 494 US 652,
659-60 (1990) (upholding legislation prohibiting non-media corporations from spending

money to influence state elections, on the ground that the press exemption served a
compelling state interest in light of the unique role of the press in providing a forum for
discussion and debate).
1
"The [State] may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly
drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering
with First Amendment freedoms." Village of Schaumburg v Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 US 620, 637 (1980) (holding overbroad an ordinance prohibiting door-to-door
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dealing with recycled newsprint, less restrictive alternatives are
available to the state. States could use general economic regulations to reduce the glut of recycled newsprint. Such generally
applicable laws would advance environmental interests, reduce
the amount of paper added to landfills, and increase the demand
for recycled paper without violating the First Amendment rights
of newspapers. For example, the price differential between recycled and non-recycled paper could be eliminated by taxing virginpulp harvesters. 2 2 Such a tax would raise the price of all paper
at the source and cause end-users to voluntarily substitute recycled product for virgin-pulp paper. This alternative neither singles out a few members of the press nor applies only to newspapers. Since all paper users, and not just newspapers, would bear
the extra burden, such a regulatory scheme would avoid the First
Amendment problems associated with differential taxation.'"
Clearly, the recycled newsprint statutes currently in force could
be more narrowly tailored. As enacted, they therefore fail strict
scrutiny.
However, one jurisdiction has enacted an alternative paper
recycling regulation that does pass constitutional muster. The
District of Columbia requires newspapers to use a minimum
percentage of recycled newsprint as part of a general scheme
promoting the use of recycled paper.' Strict scrutiny does not
apply to this statute for two reasons. First, the statute does not
single out newspapers for differential treatment. Rather, the
statute specifies minimum-content percentages not only for newsprint, but also for bleached printing and writing paper, tissue
products, unbleached packaging, and recycled paperboard.'
While the California Act and Suffolk County Law burden only

solicitation). See also Shelton v Tucker, 364 US 479, 488 (1960) ("The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the
same basic purpose.").
2
The price of virgin pulp has been held artificially low through tax subsidy of the
timber industry. Nestor, 24 Applied Econ at 416 (cited in note 118). This tax advantage
should be eliminated so that the price of virgin pulp (and therefore virgin paper) reflects
its true cost to society. Nestor believes that removing the subsidy will have little impact
on recycling because "constraints on the substitution possibilities... act to limit the
industry's response to changes in relative prices." Id. However, the elimination of the
subsidy would eventually lead to a greater supply of recycled newsprint.
1
Like the public health law in Arcara, a generally applicable regulatory regime that
increases the price of virgin pulp relative to recycled paper would almost certainly survive
a First Amendment challenge. See Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 581; text accompanying
notes 40-50.
' DC Code §§ 6-3419 through 6-3422 (Michie 1981 & Supp 1993).
125 Id at § 3419.
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publishers, the DC Statute spreads its burden across a wide
range of industries.
Second, the statute does not impermissibly target a subgroup
of newspapers. At first glance, it appears to, because paper product users are subject to the law only if they have a circulation of
at least 30,000 copies, an annual weight of at least 500 tons, or
annual gross receipts of at least $100,000 from the sale or distribution of the paper product.2 But even though small newspapers are not covered, the exemption is part of a general scheme exempting de minimis paper product users. In Mabee v White
Plains Publishing Co., the Supreme Court upheld just such a
scheme. 7 There, the Court upheld the exemption of small
newspapers with primarily local distribution from the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 because that exemption put small papers
"on a parity with other small town enterprises" that were also
exempt from the Act.'28 The DC Statute indicates that it is possible to regulate newsprint via a general scheme of regulation
applicable to all paper users.
A final alternative to the recycled newsprint laws is to allow
market forces to work unfettered. Under such a system, newspapers could gain a competitive advantage by switching to recycled
paper. 9 These newspapers would respond to the consumer's
desire to promote environmental goals through selective purchasing.8 0 Indeed, surveys indicate that shoppers are willing to
shop longer to find "environmentally friendly" products.'' Thus,
newspapers could increase their sales by using recycled newsprint and making that fact public.' 2 This approach has been
successful in other contexts. 3
Id.
1
1

327 US 178 (1946).
Id at 184.
Newspaper readers concerned about the costs of disposing of old newspapers will

buy papers that are published using a high percentage of recycled content. For a general
discussion of the marketing benefits of being "green," see Christina Duff, "Eco-Retailers"
Are CelebratingGreen Holidays, Wall St J B1 (Dec 15, 1992).
1" See Comment, "EnvironmentallyFriendly"ProductAdvertising: Its FutureRequires
a New Regulatory Authority, 42 Am U L Rev 155, 155-56 (1992).
131 See id at 155 n 2, citing Regulatory Innovations Staff, US EPA, Assessing the
Environmental Consumer Market 3 (1991).
12
In fact, much of this information is already being made public through the work of
various public interest groups. For example, the U.S. Public Interest Research Group and
the National Environmental Law Center recently listed the Atlanta Journal as using the
highest percentage of recycled newsprint of any major newspaper in 1992. Study: Dallas
MorningNews Worst, Atlanta JournalBest in Recycling, UPI (Nov 10, 1992).
1
For example, Starkist tuna sales increased substantially when it stopped trapping
dolphins and became "the good tuna company." Starkist enjoyed good publicity, and many
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For example, Pennsylvania recently established a program
designed to stimulate markets for recycled goods.'" The state is
spending several million dollars on education and publicity for a
"buy recycled" goods campaign, and is also converting a former
steel mill into a newspaper and magazine deinking plant. These
programs are expected to increase demand for recycled newsprint
throughout the production process. Pennsylvania also increases
demand by buying recycled paper for its own consumption, and
instructs
its agencies to give preference to vendors using recycled
135
paper.
Although states often address a problem by piecemeal experimentation confined to one industry for a trial period, the press
cannot be used to test economic regulation that does not apply to
other industries.3 6 Regulations that encroach on First Amendment values, such as recycled newsprint laws, must use the least
restrictive means to achieve the desired end. Because less-restrictive alternatives exist, recycled newsprint laws are unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
A generally applicable recycled content law that affected
newspapers would be constitutional. However, state laws that
apply only to newspapers, or only to some newspapers, are unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Thus, most recycled
newsprint laws are unconstitutional as presently written. States
should follow the District of Columbia's example and pursue their
environmental interests by enacting recycled newsprint laws that
cover a broad range of industries.

competing tuna companies followed suit. See, for example, Margo Harakas, 'Dolphin-safe'
Tuna Initiative Highly Effective, Calgary Herald D2 (Mar 28, 1992); Tom Sietsema, Ready,
Aim, Boycott, SF Chron IIZZI (Feb 24, 1993).
,3 Michael J. Cleary, PA Investing in Recycling Markets, 4 E Pa Bus J 1 (Jan 1993).
,' Id; 53 Pa Stat § 4000.1505 (West 1994).
' See, for example, FCC v League of Women Voters of California, 468 US 364, 396
(1984) (underinclusiveness as basis for striking down ban on editorializing); CommunityService Broadcastingof Mid-America v FCC, 593 F2d 1102, 1122 (DC Cir 1978) (regulation may be invalid as applied to noncommercial broadcasters but not to commercial
broadcasters); Arkansas Writers' Project,481 US at 234; Minneapolis Star, 460 US at 592.

